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Political campaign spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent's ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. If the challenger does not have superior campaign effectiveness, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that the incumbent always benefits from a limit as long as he has an initial voter disposition advantage, however small and regardless of the candidates' relative fundraising ability. If the challenger has higher campaign spending effectiveness, the effect of limits may be non-monotonic. If the incumbent enjoys a mild initial voter disposition advantage, a moderate limit benefits the challenger. Further restricting the limit favours the incumbent. Stricter limits may lead to the unintended consequence of increased expected spending.

This report presents data on costs of congressional campaigns, in both aggregate and (mean) average terms. The data in this report reflect spending by congressional candidates from funds donated by individuals, political action committees (PACs), parties, and candidates.

A model of campaign contributions is presented in which they depend on voter predilections, on which candidate is the incumbent, & on primary performance of the candidate. Contributions are the chief determinants of campaign spending. Thirty-three Calif congressional districts are taken as a sample for which these equations were estimated for the 1972 elections. Incumbency discourages contributions, as does incumbency of the opposing candidate; Republicans receive fewer contributions when the Democratic candidate makes a strong primary showing. Democrats are likely to spend more than they take in, especially in close races, while Republicans consistently spend less than they take in. Votes received by Democrats are more affected by expenditures of both Democratic & of Republican candidates than are votes received by Republicans. PO is more responsive to Republican expenditures. Policy implications are considered. 2 Tables. W. H. Stoddard.